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Previous studies indicate that emotion regulation may occur unconsciously, without the cost of cognitive effort, while con-
scious acceptance may enhance negative experiences despite having potential long-term health benefits. Thus, it is important to 
overcome this weakness to boost the efficacy of the acceptance strategy in negative emotion regulation. As unconscious regu-
lation occurs with little cost of cognitive resources, the current study hypothesizes that unconscious acceptance regulates the 
emotional consequence of negative events more effectively than does conscious acceptance. Subjects were randomly assigned 
to conscious acceptance, unconscious acceptance and no-regulation conditions. A frustrating arithmetic task was used to in-
duce negative emotion. Emotional experiences were assessed on the Positive Affect and Negative Affect Scale while emo-
tion-related physiological activation was assessed by heart-rate reactivity. Results showed that conscious acceptance had a sig-
nificant negative affective consequence, which was absent during unconscious acceptance. That is, unconscious acceptance 
was linked with little reduction of positive affect during the experience of frustration, while this reduction was prominent in the 
control and conscious acceptance groups. Instructed, conscious acceptance resulted in a greater reduction of positive affect 
than found for the control group. In addition, both conscious and unconscious acceptance strategies significantly decreased 
emotion-related heart-rate activity (to a similar extent) in comparison with the control condition. Moreover, heart-rate reactivi-
ty was positively correlated with negative affect and negatively correlated with positive affect during the frustration phase rela-
tive to the baseline phase, in both the control and unconscious acceptance groups. Thus, unconscious acceptance not only re-
duces emotion-related physiological activity but also better protects mood stability compared with conscious acceptance. This 
suggests that the clinical practice of acceptance therapy may need to consider using the unconscious priming of an accepting 
attitude, instead of intentionally instructing people to implement such a strategy, to boost the efficacy of acceptance in emotion 
regulation. 
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In daily life, people often encounter all kinds of negative 
events. The negative emotion induced by these events needs 
to be regulated to avoid interference with ongoing activities, 
situational demands or long-term goals. Successful control 
of emotional impulses is important for an individual’s 
well-being, health and social functioning [1–4]. 
Inspired by Gross’s process model of emotion regulation, 
prior studies have proposed two well-known strategies: 
cognitive reappraisal and expressive suppression [5–7]. 
Cognitive reappraisal focuses on the changing of the inter-
nal interpretation of stimulus meanings, while expression 
suppression focuses on the changing of the fully blown 
emotional responses [5]. Different from these traditional 
regulation strategies, acceptance is an exposure-based 
strategy defined as “the aware embracing of emotional 
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events and the active experiencing of their emotional con-
sequences, without attempts to change the frequency, form 
or impacts of the emotional events” [8]. In clinical practice, 
a number of psychotherapies based on acceptance have been 
developed, such as acceptance and commitment therapy 
[9–11], mindfulness-based cognitive therapy [12,13], and 
acceptance-based behavioral therapy [14,15]. The essence 
of these therapies is to accept emotional events and their 
emotional impact, such as training patients to fully experi-
ence their own internal and external feelings with a 
non-judgment attitude, and highlighting attention devotion 
to more valuable aspects of life. Clinical results indicate that 
psychotherapies based on acceptance are successful in the 
treatment of anxiety and depression [8,16]. The laboratory 
study of acceptance also found positive effects of ac-
ceptance, including lower negative emotion intensity 
[17–19], the reduction of anxiety and depression [20–22], 
and better adaptability to chronic pain [23]. Recently, 
Shallcross et al. [24] suggested that accepting negative 
emotion prevents individuals from long-term involvement 
in a negative mood and avoids negative emotion developing 
into depression. 
However, all the above strategies require subjective ef-
forts mobilizing cognitive resources to achieve the purpose 
of emotion regulation. This is also true for the application of 
unconscious acceptance, which requires people to accept or 
embrace unpleasant events and emotional consequences that 
are naturally processed with defensive motivation [25]. This 
process, which is counter to natural tendencies, is thus most 
likely resource costly [26]. This may explain why there is 
also evidence showing that the acceptance strategy is asso-
ciated with increases rather than decreases in negative feel-
ings [27,28], or produces no beneficial effect, similar to 
rumination [29]. Although most current research focuses on 
conscious emotion regulation, some research has indicated 
that implicit (largely unconscious) processes are strongly 
involved in emotion regulation [30]. Compared with un-
conscious emotion regulation, conscious emotion regulation 
needs more cognitive resources [31–33]. For instance, it has 
been consistently reported that the conscious suppression of 
negative emotion enhances sympathetic physiological acti-
vations, disrupts social and cognitive dysfunctions [34], or 
even impairs physical health [31–33]. These adverse out-
comes, however, are absent when unconscious emotion reg-
ulation is used. For example, previous studies have indicat-
ed that priming unconscious regulation goals decreases ex-
perienced anger without maladaptive physiological conse-
quences [35], and an automatic attention shift from negative 
to positive cues accounts for the enhanced positive affects 
in older people [30,36,37]. As other unconscious processes 
[38–41], unconscious regulation may occur without subjec-
tive awareness and cost little in terms of the attention re-
source or subjective effort. 
On the basis of the evidence described above, we pro-
pose that it is more adaptive to regulate emotions implicitly. 
Koole and Rothermund [42] defined implicit emotion regu-
lation as the process of modifying the quality, intensity, or 
duration of emotional responses without the need for con-
scious supervision and explicit intentions. The implicit 
emotion regulation is often realized by the unconscious 
pursuit of a goal. For this purpose, researchers have pre-
ceded the emotion-evoking task with an unconscious prim-
ing procedure. For instance, Mauss et al. [35] found that 
unobtrusively priming people with emotional control words 
(e.g., cool, covered) led to a less angry experience in re-
sponse to a laboratory anger provocation compared with 
people primed with words related to emotion expressions 
(e.g., volatile, boiled). Additionally, Gallo and colleagues 
[43] showed that automatizing emotion regulation goals by 
an implementation practice reduces the reactivity of the 
negative affect to mutilation images in disgust-sensitive 
individuals and to fearful images in spider-fearful individu-
als, though reducing negative affects was not explicitly re-
quested. Additionally, a recent study conducted in our la-
boratory revealed lower frustration-related heart-rate reac-
tivity when reappraisal was unconsciously primed by a sen-
tence unscrambling task than when no priming was received 
[44]. Recently, it was found that, as an important way of 
priming implicit regulation, creating implementation inten-
tion alone (e.g., if I see a dog approaching me, then I will 
stay calm) is sufficient to change emotion-relevant behav-
iors even in the absence of implementation practices [45]. 
Thus, the present study aimed at comparing the effects of 
emotion regulation using conscious and unconscious ac-
ceptance strategies, with affective responses measured in 
both behavioral (subjective emotion rating) and physiologi-
cal (heart rate) levels. The heart rate was used as the physi-
ological index of emotion regulation, because this index has 
been verified to be sensitive to frustration [46], and changes 
in emotion arousal [47]. 
Although many studies have assessed the effects of emo-
tion regulation in the context of viewing emotional scenes 
or film clips [43,48], negative emotion in real-life settings 
often comes from frustrations and setbacks, such as failing 
an exam, losing a game or being unable to accomplish pre-
determined goals. Thus, it is practically important to assess 
the effects of negative emotion regulation in ecologically 
valid, frustrating situations. With this consideration, the 
present study manipulated a complex, frustrating arithmetic 
task to induce negative emotions. 
Williams et al. [47] found that priming subjects with re-
appraisal-relevant words, despite lacking overt reappraisal 
instructions, effectively reduced cardiovascular responses. 
Similarly, we predict that priming subjects with ac-
ceptance-relevant words is able to reduce subjects’ affective 
response in terms of behavioral or physiological levels, and 
this regulation effect may be more pronounced during un-
conscious relative to conscious acceptance, because the in-
structed, conscious acceptance is resource costly and may 
enhance temporary negative feelings [26–28]. Furthermore, 
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as a physiological measure such as the heart rate has been 
validated as an index of frustration, with the heart rate in-
creasing with frustration [46,49], we predict that heart-rate 
measures in the current study would be positively correlated 
with the experienced negative emotion during the frustrat-
ing task. 
1  Method 
1.1  Participants 
Fifty-nine undergraduates (31 males; x =21.7; SD=5.1) 
were recruited for the study and were randomly divided into 
three groups: a control group (N=20, 8F/12M), conscious 
acceptance group (N=20, 11F/9M), and unconscious ac-
ceptance group (N=19, 9F/10M). Participants were paid 20 
RMB at the end of the experiment. The experimental ses-
sion lasted approximately 60 min. All the subjects reported 
no history of affective disorder and were free of any psychi-
atric medication. The subjects were free of anxiety or de-
pression symptoms, as indicated by relatively low scores for 
the measures of the Spielberg State/Trait Anxiety Scale [50] 
and Beck Depression Inventory II [51]. The subjects were 
right-handed and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
To verify whether our randomization was successful, we 
tested whether the three groups were similar in emotional 
states, emotion-related personality traits and gender compo-
site. There were no significant group differences in emo-
tion-related states and personality traits, indicated by similar 
scores in the Spielberg State Anxiety Scale (F(2, 56)=0.71, 
P=0.50), the Spielberg Trait Anxiety Scale (F(2, 56)=1.01, 
P=0.35), the Beck Depression Inventory-II (F(2, 56)=1.37, 
P=0.26) and the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale [52] (F(2, 
56)=2.19, P=0.12; Figure 1). In addition, the gender com-
posite was not significantly different across the three groups; 
2(2, 57)=0.983. The experiment used the Emotion Regula-
tion Questionnaire [32] and Acceptance and Action Ques-
tionnaire [53] to check whether the habitual emotion regula-
tion style was successfully controlled. The results showed 
no significant differences in the habitual use of suppression 
(F(2, 56)=1.99, P=0.15), reappraisal (F(2, 56)=1.25, P=0.29) 
and acceptance (F(2, 56)=0.67, P=0.52) (Figure 1).   
1.2  Frustrating task 
The frustrating task included 20 trials. In each trial, partici-
pants were instructed to count the number of triangles in a 
complex graphic presented on the computer screen. They 
received feedback of whether their answer was correct or 
incorrect. Incorrect feedback and correct feedback appeared 
in a fixed order, but this manipulation was unknown to the 
subjects. Correct feedback was presented in the second and 
seventh trials and incorrect feedback in the other trials. The 
20 graphics used for the task were selected from 38 graphics 
that were evaluated in a pilot study. A separate group of 40 
participants took part in this pilot to evaluate the material. 
After counting the number of triangles in the complex fig-
ure, participants were instructed to rate the complexity of 
the figure on a scale from 1 (not difficult at all) to 8 (ex-
tremely difficult). Their response times during triangle 
counting were also recorded. On the basis of these results, 
we selected 18 moderately complex figures, for which the  
 
 
Figure 1  The scores of three groups on the Spielberg State Anxiety Scale, Spielberg Trait Anxiety Scale, Beck Depression Inventory-II, Rosenberg 
Self-Esteem, ERQ-RE (reappraisal), ERQ-SU (suppression) and AAQ (Acceptance and Action Questionnaire). Error bars represent the standard errors of the 
mean values. ns: not significant. 
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averaged response time was 39 s.  
To ensure that participants were not skeptical of the ex-
perimental purpose, the 18 graphics associated with erro-
neous feedback were moderately difficult and the two 
graphics associated with correct feedback were relatively 
simple. At the same time, according to the average time that 
participants spent on the 18 moderately complex figures in 
the material assessment, the maximum duration of figure 
presentation was set to 39 s in the experiment.  
1.3  Procedure 
After arrival at the laboratory, participants were placed in a 
separate room containing the psychophysiological recording 
equipment, where they received information about the tri-
angle-counting task. Participants were then prepared for 
psychophysiological recordings. We attached a sensor to 
each participant’s thumb for continuous recording of the 
heart rate. The experiment consisted of three phases: a base-
line phase, a task phase and a recovery phase.  
1.3.1  Baseline phase 
In the baseline phase, we instructed participants to rest for 3 
min, during which time the baseline heart-rate reactivity 
was recorded. After this 3-min rest time, participants were 
asked to complete the Positive Affect and Negative Affect 
Scale (PANAS). This phase was designed to control the 
potential effect of pre-experiment group differences on the 
emotion regulation effects.  
1.3.2  Task phase and emotion regulation instruction 
In the task phase, participants performed two tasks. First, 
they were required to complete a scrambled sentence task, 
in which they needed to construct a grammatical four-word 
sentence from five-word jumbles [54]. Those primed with 
the acceptance goal unscrambled five neutral sentences and 
10 sentences containing words or phrases related to ac-
ceptance (such as “accept”). Participants in the conscious 
reappraisal and control groups unscrambled 15 neutral sen-
tences. 
In the second task, participants were given an explana-
tion of the difficult triangle-counting task. The instructions 
were: “First, the screen will present a ‘+’ fixation alerting 
you to begin the test. After the ‘+’ fixation disappears, a 
complex figure will appear on the screen, the figure will be 
presented for 39 s (the average completion time for college 
students in our previous study). Please count the number of 
triangles embedded in the figure within this time limit, and 
input your answer after the figure disappears. Once input-
ting the answer, feedback about the correctness of your an-
swer will be provided for 300 ms. If you have understood 
the instructions, press the ‘Enter’ key to start the experi-
ment.” Unknown to the subjects, the feedback was manipu-
lated to be negative in 18 trials (“wrong”) and to be positive 
in two trials (correct). Final feedback was provided for 30 s 
at the end of the experiment, which reminded subjects of 
their overall performance in the task (10%; i.e., 2/20). 
Participants under the unconscious acceptance and con-
trol conditions received no further instructions. Participants 
under the conscious acceptance condition were provided 
with the following additional instructions [27]: “The task is 
a bit difficult and therefore you may sometimes experience 
frustration. If this happens, please try to accept and experi-
ence your negative emotion naturally and not to change or 
control it in any way. Let your emotion run naturally, and 
think of it as a natural phenomenon, just like a cloud pass-
ing in the sky. Please allow yourself to remain harmonious 
with your negative emotions.” 
After participants completed the frustrating task, the 
feedback about the accuracy (10%) of triangle counting was 
presented on the screen. Participants then rated their emo-
tional experience again. Additionally, the conscious ac-
ceptance group needed to rate the extent to which they ap-
plied the emotion regulation instructions during the task.  
1.3.3  Recovery phase 
After completing the frustrating task, a 3-min rest (recovery 
phase) was implemented; this phase was designed to help 
participants recover from the negative mood induced by the 
frustrating task. Participants completed the modified 
PANAS questionnaire when the recovery was over. 
Finally, participants were probed for suspicion of the 
experimental purposes and debriefed using the funneled 
debriefing method [55]. No participants indicated suspicion 
of the purposes of the priming and task procedures.  
1.4  Behavior and physiological measures 
1.4.1  Subjective emotion experience 
Emotion experience was assessed using PANAS [56]. 
PANAS contains 20 emotion descriptors, 10 items measur-
ing positive affect and 10 items measuring negative affect. 
All items in PANAS are typically rated on five-point Likert 
scales, ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely). To 
measure emotion changes in participants more sensitively, 
all items were rated on seven-point Likert scales, ranging 
from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely), in our experiment. In the 
experiment, all the items of PANAS were encoded into the 
E-prime program. Participants press the corresponding 
number key to complete the rating. 
1.4.2  Physiological measure 
In the experiment, we used a Spirit biofeedback instrument 
with 10 wireless telemetry (Bluetooth) channels. Physio-
logical channels were sampled at 32 Hz. Biotrace software 
recorded the data simultaneously with the experimental 
progress. The heart rate was used as a measure of physio-
logical activity related to the emotional response, consistent 
with recent investigations of the effect of emotion regula-
tion on cardiovascular reactivity [35,47]. During the collec-
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tion of data, the biotrace software computed average values 
in each phase. 
2  Results 
2.1  Manipulation check 
The first manipulation check was to examine whether our 
triangle-counting task successfully induced negative emo-
tion. We conducted a paired-sample t-test of subjective ex-
perience and heart-rate measures between baseline and task 
phases in the control group, where emotion induction was 
free of regulatory influences. The positive emotion measure 
of PANAS was significantly lower in the task phase 
( x =35.20, SD=8.77) than in the baseline phase ( x =42.90, 
SD=8.93; t(19)=3.9, P<0.001). The negative emotion 
measure of PANAS was significantly higher in the task 
phase ( x =26.75, SD=8.83) than in the baseline phase 
( x =16.85, SD=4.72; t(19)=5.2, p<0.01). The heart-rate 
reactivity was significantly higher in the task phase 
( x =86.30, SD=9.45) than in the baseline ( x =82.0, 
SD=9.72; t(19)=5.4, P<0.001). These results verified that 
the triangle-counting task used in this study successfully 
induced negative emotional consequences. 
The statistical analysis of the change scores of subjective 
emotion and heartbeats from baseline to frustration phases 
also supported that the frustration-inducing task successful-
ly induced a negative emotional state. We compared the 
change scores of positive affect, negative affect, and heart-
beat measures with a score of zero in the control group. 
Results showed that the positive affect measure (t(19)= 
4.03, P<0.01), negative affect measure (t(19)=4.73, 
P<0.01) and heartbeat measure (t(19)=5.18, P<0.01) were 
all significantly different from zero. 
The second manipulation check examined whether sub-
jects under the conscious acceptance condition successfully 
complied with the acceptance instruction. Subjects in the 
conscious acceptance group were asked to rate the extent to 
which they accepted their frustration on a six-point scale (1: 
not at all; 6: extremely) immediately after completing the 
task. The analysis of the instruction confirmation ratings 
showed that the acceptance strategy was successfully used 
in the task ( x =4.38, SD=0.70). The scores were signifi-
cantly higher than the midpoint of the rating scale 
(t(20)=8.55, P<0.01). 
The third manipulation check aimed to examine whether 
the time spent on the frustrating task, and the time interval 
from the task termination to the start of the recovery period, 
were similar across the three groups. Results showed that 
the control group ( x =975 s, SD=19 s), conscious ac-
ceptance group ( x =978 s, SD=21 s) and unconscious ac-
ceptance group ( x =970 s, SD=22 s) had no significant dif-
ference in the time spent on the frustrating task (F(2, 56) 
=0.75, P=0.48, 2=0.03). Additionally, the control group 
( x =33.70 s, SD=2.77 s), conscious acceptance group 
( x =34.65 s, SD=2.34 s) and unconscious acceptance group 
( x =33.79 s, SD=2.62 s) had no significant difference in the 
time interval from the end of the frustrating task to the be-
ginning of the recovery period (F(2, 56)=0.82, P=0.45, 
2=0.03).  
2.2  Randomization check 
Analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were conducted to exam-
ine whether the experimental groups were similar in terms 
of their baseline emotional state. The three groups showed 
similar levels of positive emotion (PANAS-P; F(2, 
56)=0.34, P=0.72, 2=0.01), negative emotion (PANAS-N; 
F(2, 56)=0.38, P=0.68, 2=0.013) and heart rate (F(2, 
56)=2.33, P=0.11, 2=0.077). Thus, the three groups were 
similar in their pre-experiment emotional state, ruling out 
the possibility that post-experiment group differences were 
due to pre-treatment group differences in emotional states. 
2.3  Emotion regulation effect on the subjective expe-
rience 
To check whether different experimental treatments have a 
significant effect on the individual’s emotional level during 
the frustration-inducing phase, we conducted univariate 
ANOVAs with the positive and negative emotional experi-
ences during the frustrating task (Figure 2). The emotional 
level was measured using the positive affect index and neg-
ative affect index of PANAS. First, we conducted ANOVA 
with the negative affect index of PANAS. To control the 
possible effect of individual differences in the baseline 
phase, the negative affect in the baseline phase was entered 
as a covariate. Results revealed that there was no significant 
difference among the three groups; F(2, 55)=0.86, P=0.43, 
2=0.030. Similarly, we conducted ANOVA with the posi-
tive affect index of PANAS, and the positive affect index in 
the baseline phase was entered as a covariate. The ANOVA 
revealed that the three groups were significantly different in 
terms of their positive affect index during the experience of 
frustration; F(2, 55)=4.2, P=0.02, 2=0.134. Post hoc com-
parisons using Bonferroni correction indicated that the un-
conscious acceptance group ( x =38.42, SD=9.01) was sig-
nificantly different from the conscious acceptance group 
( x =32.80, SD=10.03; F(1, 36)=8.09, P=0.02, 2=0.18). 
There were no significant differences between the uncon-
scious acceptance group and the control group ( x =35.20, 
SD=8.78; F(1, 36)=2.91, P=0.41, 2=0.08) or between the 
conscious acceptance group and the control group (F(1, 
37)=1.68, P=0.48, 2=0.04). To control for the possible 
effect of individual differences in emotion-related traits on 
the group differences of interest, we analyzed positive affect 
changes (frustration-baseline) using SATI-state, SATI-trait, 
BDI, Rosenberg Self-esteem, ERQ-RE, ERQ-SU and AAQ 
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scores as covariates. The results showed greater positive 
affect reduction for the conscious acceptance group 
( x =11.71) than for the unconscious ( x =2.07, P=0.001) 
and control ( x =6.62, P=0.05) groups; while the positive 
affect reduction tended to be less for the unconscious group 
than for the control group (P=0.088). Additionally, the di-
rect test of the frustration-baseline differences showed a 
significant positive affect reduction in the conscious 
(P<0.001) and control (P=0.001) groups but not in the un-
conscious group (P=0.27), indicated by a significant phase- 
by-group interaction (F(2, 49)=6.69, P=0.003, 2=0.21). 
To check whether the emotional recovery procedure ef-
fectively reduced negative consequences elicited by the 
frustrating situation, we conducted a t-test of the subjective 
affect indexes of the three groups from frustration to recov-
ery phases. The negative affect report was significantly less 
in the recovery phase than in the frustration phase for each 
group; P<0.01. In addition, the positive affect reported by 
the conscious acceptance group was significantly higher in 
the recovery phase than in the frustration phase; t(19)=2.3, 
P=0.04. These results suggest that the recovery procedure 
was useful in helping participants to recover their mood. To 
further assess the degree of emotional recovery of partici-
pants, we compared the emotional measures between base-
line and recovery phases. The negative affect was not sig-
nificantly different between recovery and baseline phases 
for all three groups (P>0.05), and the positive affect index 
of the three groups was significantly lower in the recovery 
phase than in the baseline phase; P<0.01. The results reveal 
that, though the recovery procedure was useful in restoring 
the mood state, it did not restore the subjects’ mood to the 
baseline level. This further suggests that the frustrating situ-
ation successfully induced a negative emotional conse-
quence. 
2.4  Emotion regulation effect on the physiological index 
For physiological activity, a similar ANOVA was conduct-
ed with the heart-rate activity during the task. To control for 
the possible effect of individual differences in baseline 
heart-rate reactivity, the heart rate in the baseline phase was 
entered as a covariate. The ANOVA revealed that the three 
groups were significantly different in terms of their 
heart-rate reactivity; F(2, 55)=4.31, P=0.02, 2=0.135 (Fig-
ure 3). Post hoc comparisons using Bonferroni correction 
indicate that the unconscious acceptance group ( x =82.72, 
SD=9.63) had significantly lower heart-rate reactivity than 
the control group ( x =86.30, SD=9.45; F(1, 36)=7.40, 
P=0.01, 2=0.17) during the experience of frustration. In 
addition, the conscious acceptance group ( x =78.29, 
SD=7.69) had significantly lower heart-rate reactivity than 
the control group ( x =86.30, SD=9.45; F(1, 36)=4.37, 
P=0.03, 2=0.11). However, the unconscious acceptance 
and conscious acceptance groups showed no significant 
differences in their heart-rate reactivity during the experi-
ence of frustration (F(1, 36)=0.01, P=0.92, 2<0.01). These 
results were reliable, as the same group differences were 
obtained after entering emotion-related personality 
measures as covariates into the ANOVA model; F(2, 
48)=3.89, P=0.03, 2=0.14. 
Similarly, to check whether the recovery procedure ef-
fectively reduced physiological activity elicited by frustra-
tion, we compared the heart-rate reactivity of the three 
groups during the recovery phase with that during the frus-
tration phase. The heart-rate reactivity of each of the three 
groups was significantly lower in the recovery phase than in 
the frustration phase; P<0.01. To further assess the extent of 
mood recovery, we conducted a t-test with the heart-rate 
reactivity in baseline and recovery phases. The heart-rate 
reactivity of each of the three groups showed no significant    
 
 
Figure 2  Mean subjective emotion ratings for baseline, task (frustration) and recovery phases in the three groups. Error bars represent the standard errors 
of the mean values.*: P<0.05.  
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Figure 3  Mean heart rates for pre-experiment baseline, task (frustration) 
and recovery phases in the three groups. Error bars represent the standard 
errors of the mean values. *: P<0.05.  
differences between these two phases. The result suggests 
that the recovery procedure was useful in restoring physio-
logical activity to the pre-experiment state for each group. 
2.5  Correlations between subjective emotion and heart- 
rate activity 
To examine whether the enhanced heart-rate reactivity dur- 
ing the frustrating task effectively predicts an increase in the 
level of the negative subjective experience, we analyzed the 
Spearman correlation between the reported emotional 
change and the heart-rate change during the frustration 
phase relative to the baseline phase in the control group. At 
the same time, to further explore the regulating effects of 
conscious acceptance and unconscious acceptance, we con-
ducted similar correlation analyses for the conscious ac-
ceptance and unconscious acceptance groups (Figure 4). 
The results showed a positive correlation between the nega-
tive affect change and heart-rate change (R=0.39, P=0.05) 
and a trend of negative correlation between positive affect 
change and heart-rate change (R=0.31, P=0.09) in the con-
trol group. Similarly, there was a trend of positive correla-
tion between the negative affect change and heart-rate 
change (R=0.38, P=0.06) and a trend of negative correlation 
between the positive affect change and heart-rate change 
(R=0.33, P=0.08) in the unconscious acceptance group. 
However, there was no correlation between the negative 
affect change and heart-rate change (R=0.00, P=0.50) or 
between the positive affect change and heart-rate change 
(R=0.10, P=0.33) in the conscious acceptance group. These 
results suggest that heart-rate activity is a likely valid pre-
dictor of negative emotion intensity in unconscious ac-
ceptance and control groups. 
 
 
Figure 4  Scatterplots for the correlations between PANAS and heart-rate reactivity during the frustration phase relative to the baseline phase in the control 
(top panel) and unconscious acceptance (bottom panel) groups.  
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3  Discussion 
Previous studies suggest that personal relevance is an im-
portant component for effective emotional induction, such 
that emotional stimuli with personal relevance evoked more 
intense emotional reactivity than those without personal 
relevance [57,58]. In real-life settings, negative emotions 
that people experience often result from negative events that 
have close personal relevance, such as self-experienced 
frustrations and setbacks like failing an exam or losing a 
sports game. Both this empirical evidence and anecdotal 
evidence imply that it is highly important to induce emotion 
in an ecologically valid, self-relevant paradigm. Although 
many prior studies have assessed the effects of emotion 
regulation in the context of viewing emotional pictures or 
film clips [17,18,27,59,60], the depictions of these materials 
were not directly relevant to the observers. To date, few 
studies have used experimental paradigms whose emotion 
induction closely resembles that in natural situations, such 
as negative emotions induced by frustration and setbacks. 
On the basis of these considerations, the present study ma-
nipulated an ecologically valid, frustrating arithmetic task to 
induce negative emotions and investigate emotion down- 
regulation by unconscious acceptance. The results showed 
that unconscious acceptance produced little reduction of 
positive affect, while such reduction was most pronounced 
during conscious acceptance of frustration. In addition, both 
conscious and unconscious acceptance strategies signifi-
cantly decreased emotion-related heart-rate activity (to a 
similar extent) in comparison with the control condition. In 
the control and unconscious acceptance groups, heart-rate 
reactivity was positively correlated with the negative affect 
rating and negatively correlated with the positive affect rat-
ing during the frustration phase compared with the baseline 
phase. However, heart-rate reactivity had no correlation 
with positive and negative affect ratings in the conscious 
acceptance group. These results suggest that unconscious 
acceptance is more effective than conscious acceptance in 
regulating negative emotional consequences during the ex-
perience of frustration.  
Many researches have shown that conscious acceptance 
effectively reduces negative emotion and its relevant physi-
ological arousal [18,61,62]. Consistent with this evidence, 
the present study found that conscious acceptance effec-
tively reduced subjects’ frustration-related heart rate activity. 
However, the instructed, conscious acceptance did not re-
duce, and significantly increased, the subjective frustrating 
experience in comparison with the control group, as shown 
by the largest positive affect reduction in the conscious ac-
ceptance group during the frustrating task (Figure 2). This is 
consistent with existing evidence showing that instructed 
acceptance is unable to decrease negative emotion immedi-
ately after emotion induction [27–29,63]. In addition, con-
sciously instructed acceptance requires subjects to embrace 
their negative emotions naturally and even to experience the 
feeling deeply [14,15]. Fully embracing negative experi-
ences requires intentional dropping of the natural defensive 
tendencies. This process is resource costly and may intensi-
fy immediate unpleasant feelings [28]. This most likely ex-
plains why instructed acceptance was associated with the 
lowest positive affect values. Although conscious ac-
ceptance reduced frustration-related physiological reactions, 
it did not reduce subjective experienced frustration. The 
dissociation of subjective emotional and physiological in-
dexes during conscious acceptance was also supported by 
the lack of a correlation between the heart rate and emo-
tional experiences during conscious acceptance. In addition, 
some studies have suggested that conscious acceptance is 
unable to regulate emotional feeling immediately after the 
subject experiences stress [28], watches annoying videos or 
recalls a disaster experience [27]. Clinical studies on ac-
ceptance found that the outcome of mindfulness therapies 
based on acceptance may emerge after a long period of 
training [64,65]. During the recovery stage of our study, the 
positive affect index of the conscious acceptance group 
showed a notable improvement, suggesting that the regula-
tion of emotional feeling using conscious acceptance may 
not be an immediate, fast process. 
The current study found that, in contrast to conscious 
acceptance, unconscious priming of the acceptance strategy 
was not only useful in maintaining subjects’ positive affec-
tive state but also significantly mitigated emotion-related 
physiological activity during the experience of frustration. 
A couple of previous studies indicated that unconscious 
regulatory processes reduced negative emotional experi-
ences or emotion-related physiological reactivity, without 
the cost of cognitive effort or physiological resources 
[30,35,37]. In the present experiment, unconscious ac-
ceptance effectively regulated heart-rate reactivity during 
the experience of frustration. Consistent with our result, 
Williams and colleagues [47] observed that unconscious 
reappraisal also successfully reduced heart-rate reactivity 
elicited by anxiety. For the subjective emotional index that 
was not investigated in Williams’ study, we observed that 
unconscious acceptance was linked with the smallest, 
non-significant reduction of positive affect measures. In the 
unconscious acceptance group, heart-rate reactivity was 
positively correlated with the negative affect rating and 
negatively correlated with the positive affect rating during 
the frustration phase compared with the baseline phase. 
These results showed that, unlike conscious acceptance, 
unconscious acceptance did not lead to a dissociation of 
subjective experience and physiological reactivity, probably 
because unconscious acceptance does not entail the inten-
tional, conscious embrace of frustrating, unpleasant emo-
tional consequences. Therefore, compared with conscious 
acceptance, unconscious acceptance is more adaptive in 
regulating frustrating emotional consequences.  
Unlike the regulation effect on the positive affect index, 
conscious acceptance and unconscious acceptance had no 
significant difference in terms of the regulation effect on the  
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negative affect index. There may be two potential reasons 
for this. Firstly, the PA (positive affect) and NA (negative 
affect) subscales of PANAS are two relatively independent 
dimensions [66,67]. PA reflects the extent to which a person 
feels enthusiastic, active, and alert; NA reflects the extent to 
which a person feels distress, displeasure, and disgust [56]. 
There is evidence showing that PA and NA only have low 
to moderate negative correlation [56]. This suggests that, 
though a decline in the PA score might accompany a rise in 
the NA score, this relation is not robust, and may vary 
across different situations. Secondly, PA and NA are dif-
ferent in terms of the emotional categories they are sensitive 
to. For example, studies have found that PA is different 
from NA in its efficacy for discerning clinical mood disor-
ders: it is difficult to discern anxiety from depression by the 
use of the NA index, while the PA index is a valid index of 
depression but has little correlation with anxiety [68,69]. 
This suggests that PA, instead of NA, is an effective scale 
for assessing depression. Crawford and Henry [70] found 
that PA of PANAS has greater explanatory power for de-
pression than NA in non-clinical samples. Consistent with 
this evidence, many studies have found that frustration elic-
ited by negative feedback is valid in inducing depression 
[71–74]. Therefore, in the present study, PA most likely 
reflects the depression state induced by the frustrating task 
more sensitively than NA, which may account for the simi-
lar NA reports across different groups.  
Lastly, one may question that the greater positive affect 
reduction during the conscious acceptance condition may 
have an alternative explanation: conscious acceptance group 
were overtly instructed that “the task is difficult so that they 
may experience frustration”, while this instruction was ab-
sent for the other two groups. This might have led to a neg-
ative anticipation that enhanced negative feelings. This pos-
sibility, however, may not hold true in our study. Firstly, it 
has been reported that negative anticipation is bound to in-
creased anxiety [75], which is mainly manifested by higher 
NA scores in PANAS assessment [76]. However, the cur-
rent study found no significant differences in NA scores 
between conscious acceptance and the other groups. Sec-
ondly, our prior study exploring emotion regulation effect 
of conscious reappraisal also overtly alerted conscious re-
appraisal subjects of potential frustration, while this overt 
instruction was absent for the control subjects. However, it 
was found that conscious reappraisal did not increase, but 
significantly reduced the negative emotional experiences in 
comparison with the control group [44]. These evidences 
jointly suggest that the largest positive affect reduction dur-
ing conscious acceptance should be explained by the inter-
nal characteristics of conscious acceptance, rather than neg-
ative anticipation.  
4  Conclusion 
The present study revealed that both conscious and uncon-
scious acceptance strategies significantly decreased emo-
tion-related heart-rate activity. Nevertheless, conscious ac-
ceptance had a significant negative subjective emotional 
consequence, which was absent during unconscious priming 
of the acceptance strategy. Unconscious acceptance was not 
linked with a significant reduction in positive affect during 
the experience of frustration, while this reduction was 
prominent in the control and conscious acceptance groups. 
Instructed, conscious acceptance resulted in less positive 
affect than reported for the control group. This is likely due 
to the characteristics of conscious acceptance entailing ac-
tive experience and the full embrace of negative emotional 
experiences, which may intensify immediate depressive 
feelings. These effortful processes, however, are unneces-
sary when priming subjects unconsciously with the ac-
ceptance attitude. This suggests that the clinical use of the 
acceptance strategy may need to consider using unconscious 
priming of the acceptance strategy, instead of intentionally 
instructing people to adopt the strategy, for boosting of the 
efficacy of acceptance in emotion regulation.  
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